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Abstract
One of the advantages of conduct parameter games is that they enable
estimation of market power without total cost data. In line with this,
we develop a conduct parameter based model to estimate the rm spe-
cic marginal cost e¢ ciencyand conduct without using total cost data.
The marginal cost e¢ ciency is an alternative measure of e¢ ciency that is
based on deadweight loss. We illustrate our methodology by estimating
rm-route-quarter specic conducts and marginal cost e¢ ciencies of U.S.
airlines for Chicago based routes without using route-level total cost data.
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1 Introduction
The Lerner index (1934) is a widely used market power measure, which is the
ratio of price-marginal cost mark-up and price. One of the di¢ culties for calcu-
lating the Lerner index is that total cost data may not be available making the
estimation of the marginal cost di¢ cult. A solution to this problem is estimating
a conduct parameter (or conjectural variations) game1 in which rms form con-
jectures about the variation in other rmsstrategies (e.g., output) in response
to a change in their own strategies. For given demand and cost conditions, the
conjectures corresponding to the observed price-cost margins can be estimated
as-if the rms are playing a conduct parameter game. In this setting, the
implied marginal costcan be estimated via a supply-demand system.
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) literature2 su¤ers from a similar problem.
That is, the standard SFA models require total cost data in order to estimate the
cost e¢ ciency of a rm. Moreover, as we will describe in the next section, market
power and e¢ ciency are closely related concepts and ignoring ine¢ ciency in a
conduct parameter model may lead to inconsistent conduct parameter estimates.
What is more, ignoring the ine¢ ciencies of productive units may invalidate the
standard deadweight loss (DWL) calculations since DWL from collusive behav-
ior depends on ine¢ ciency levels.3 If the productive units exhibit ine¢ ciency
that is misinterpreted as rm heterogeneity, then the standard calculations of
DWL become invalid. In such cases, Kutlu and Sickles (2012) recommend using
what they call the e¢ cient full marginal cost (EFMC) for markup calculation.4
Hence, estimation of conduct, marginal cost, and marginal cost e¢ ciency would
be essential for a valid DWL calculation. We overcome all these issues by com-
bining conduct parameter and SFA literatures so as to generalize a conventional
conduct parameter model to allow ine¢ ciency in marginal cost. This enables
the estimation of marginal cost e¢ ciencies and conduct parameters jointly and
consistently without using total cost data. In contrast to the SFA literature,
which infers cost e¢ ciency from a cost function, we estimate the marginal cost
e¢ ciency from a supply-demand system that is derived from our conduct pa-
rameter game. This introduces a related but di¤erent measure of e¢ ciency
that is based on deadweight loss (DWL), i.e., marginal cost e¢ ciency. There-
fore, the marginal cost e¢ ciency concept would be a valuable tool for antitrust
1See Perlo¤ et al. (2007) and Bresnahan (1989) for more details on conduct parameter
approach.
2See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) for a book-length survey on SFA and Sickles (2005) for
a simulation study examining the performances of some estimators in the SFA literature.
3See Comanor and Leibenstein (1969) and Kutlu and Sickles (2012) for more details about
calculation of DWL when rms are ine¢ cient.
4Kutlu and Sickles (2012) dene EFMC as the sum of a shadow cost and e¢ cient marginal
cost that is calculated using stochastic frontier analysis techniques. The shadow cost reects
the constraints that the rms face such as capacity or incentive compatibility constraints.
E¢ cient marginal cost is the marginal cost when the rm achieves full e¢ ciency. Although
they dene the EFMC concept, they calculate EFMC using cost e¢ ciency estimates obtained
from a standard stochastic cost frontier model. Hence, while the concept is due to Kutlu and
Sickles (2012), arguably, we develop a more proper method that can directly calculate EFMC.
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authorities.
We would like to note that our methodology can be applied to a variety
of existing conduct parameter settings. Hence, we consider our study as a
guideline for estimating conduct parameter models in the presence of (marginal
cost) ine¢ ciency. Examples for how this can be accomplished are illustrated in
the Appendix. Hence, our study provides a link between industrial organization
and SFA literatures to enable researchers to model ine¢ ciency in more structural
settings.
In order to illustrate how our methodology can be used in an empirical frame-
work, we apply our methodology to estimate the rm-route-quarter specic con-
ducts and marginal cost e¢ ciencies of U.S. airlines for routes that originate in
Chicago.5 The time period that our data set covers is 1999I-2009IV. One of the
di¢ culties that empirical researchers face is that the availability of cost data.
Aggregate airline cost data is available but not at the route level. Therefore,
route level total cost data is not available. Kutlu and Sickles (2012) try to
overcome this problem by incorporating a specic number of enplanements for
each airline, a specic distance of each city-pair, and airline xed e¤ects when
estimating the cost function.6 This enables the calculation of rm-route-quarter
specic marginal costs from the cost function estimation. However, their e¢ -
ciency estimates are still aggregate rm-quarter specic making it di¢ cult to
understand route-specic di¢ culties that may increase ine¢ ciency.7 Moreover,
Kutlu and Sickles (2012) rst estimate cost e¢ ciencies using a standard sto-
chastic frontier model.8 These derived e¢ ciency estimates are used to estimate
the supply relation.9 The conduct estimates are conditional on these derived
e¢ ciency estimates. In contrast to their study, we jointly estimate the rm-
route-quarter specic conducts and marginal cost e¢ ciencies of the U.S. airlines
without the use of route specic total cost data.10 Compared to the standard
stochastic frontier e¢ ciency measures, our e¢ ciency concept is a more relevant
measure from the antitrust point of view. Moreover, our empirical results for
the relationship between market concentration and e¢ ciency can be used as a
robustness check from another perspective. Our results suggest that concentra-
tion ratio (measured by CR4) and market share are negatively related to the
marginal cost e¢ ciency. In contrast to this, the concentration ratio and market
share are positively related to the conduct. Finally, we nd that both the con-
5See Berry and Jia (2010) for a paper that is studying airline performance in a di¤erent
framework.
6Weiher et al. (2002) use a similar approach.
7Since Kutlu and Sickles (2012) estimate an aggregate model (i.e., route specic market
power), they use market share weighted e¢ ciency estimates in their estimations. That is why
their route specic e¢ ciency variables are not the same for di¤erent routes.
8Kutlu and Sickles (2012) use a variation of the distribution free approach proposed by
Cornwell et al. (1990). Kutlu (2017b) discusses some of the potential estimation di¢ culties
for such distribution free approaches.
9When calculating DWL values, Kutlu and Sickles (2012) used SFA-type e¢ ciency esti-
mates as a proxy for marginal cost e¢ ciency.
10Similar to our study, Delis and Tsionas (2009) simultaneously estimate bank conducts
and e¢ ciencies. However, their model requires total cost data. Hence, as it stands, their
methodology is not applicable to our airline example.
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duct and DWL estimates may be biased if a conventional conduct parameter
model, which ignores marginal cost ine¢ ciency, is used.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briey discuss
the relationship between market power and e¢ ciency. In Section 3, we build
up our theoretical model. In Section 4, we describe our data set, present our
empirical model, and discuss our results. In the next section, we make our
concluding remarks. Finally, in the Appendix, we present extensions of the
theoretical model.
2 Market Power and E¢ ciency
The Quiet Life Hypothesis(QLH) by Hicks (1935) and the E¢ cient Struc-
ture Hypothesis(ESH) by Demsetz (1973) are two well-known hypotheses that
relate market power to e¢ ciency. The former claims that higher competitive
pressure is likely to force management work harder, which in turn increases
e¢ ciencies of rms. The latter states that the rms with superior e¢ ciency lev-
els use their competitive advantages to gain larger market shares, which leads
to higher market concentration and thus higher market power. The ndings
of Berger and Hannan (1998) and Kutlu and Sickles (2012) support the QLH
for the banking and airline industries, respectively. However, Maudos and Fer-
nández de Guevara (2007) show evidence for ESH applicable to the banking
industry. Delis and Tsionas (2009) are in favor of the QLH on average but ac-
knowledge that the ESH may prevail in the case of for the highly e¢ cient banks.
The relationship between market power and e¢ ciency has long been acknowl-
edged by economists. However, market power and SFA literatures largely ig-
nore this relationship. Delis and Tsionas (2009), Koetter and Poghosyan (2009),
Koetter et al. (2012), and Kutlu and Sickles (2012) exemplify some studies that
attempt to estimate the market powers of rms in frameworks where rms are
allowed to be ine¢ cient. Except for Delis and Tsionas (2009), the market power
estimates in these studies are conditional on e¢ ciency estimates.
In conduct parameter models, ignoring marginal cost ine¢ ciency can poten-
tially cause inconsistent conduct parameter estimates. In particular, the conduct
parameter estimates may pick up some of the marginal cost ine¢ ciency. Delis
and Tsionas (2009) argue that if the ine¢ ciency is not taken into account, the
optimization model of rms become irrelevant, which would lead to severe bias
as the level of ine¢ ciency increases. Similarly, ignoring market power (conduct
parameter) can potentially cause inconsistent cost e¢ ciency or marginal cost ef-
ciency estimates. The di¤erences in market powers would lead to di¤erent rm
behavior and this can be confused with the rm level ine¢ ciency. Generally,
e¢ ciencies are measured by closeness of production units to the best-practice
units observed in the market. If the rm level conducts a¤ect the performance
of the best-practice units, then the e¢ ciency estimates which do not take this
into account would not be accurate. For instance, in a market facing a Cournot
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competition the best practicing rm may not really be fully e¢ cient.11 As men-
tioned in the introduction, our methodology aims to overcome these di¢ culties
by explicitly and simultaneously modeling conduct parameter and marginal cost
e¢ ciency.
3 Theoretical Model
In this section, we describe the theoretical framework, used to estimate marginal
cost e¢ ciencies and conducts of rms without total cost data. The stochastic
frontier literature relaxes full e¢ ciency assumption of neoclassical production
theory by allowing the rms to be ine¢ cient. The ine¢ ciency is treated as an
unobserved component, which is captured by a one-sided error term. In the
conventional stochastic frontier framework, the cost e¢ ciencies of rms would
be estimated by the following model:
lnC (qit;Xc;it) = lnC
 (qit;Xc;it) + uit + vit. (1)
where qit is the quantity of rm i at time t; Xc;it is a vector of variables related
to cost; uit  0 is a term which is capturing the ine¢ ciency; vit is the usual
two-sided error term; and C is the deterministic component of cost when rms
achieve full e¢ ciency. A variety of distributions are proposed for uit including
the half normal (Aigner, et al., 1977), exponential (Meeusen and van den Broeck,
1977), truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980), and gamma (Greene, 1980a, 1980b,
2003) distributions. The cost e¢ ciency of a rm, EFFit, is estimated by:
EFFit = exp ( u^it) (2)
u^it = E [uit j uit + vit] .
The stochastic frontier approach requires detailed cost data, which many
times is not available. We utilize the conduct parameter approach to overcome
this issue. For this purpose, instead of modelling total cost as in the conventional
SFA models, we directly model marginal cost, c, as follows:
ln c (qit;Xc;it) = ln c
 (qit;Xc;it) + uit + vit. (3)
where c is the deterministic component of marginal cost when rms achieve full
e¢ ciency; uit  0 is a term which is capturing the marginal cost ine¢ ciency;
and vit is a two-sided random variable, which is observed by the rm but not
observed by the researcher. We call c e¢ cient marginal cost (EMC). Rather
than estimating a cost function, we estimate a supply-demand system that en-
ables us to calculate the marginal cost e¢ ciency. From the antitrust point of
11Lee and Johnson (2015) argue that in imperfectly competitive markets ine¢ ciency may
in fact be a result of endogenous prices and the e¤ect of output production on price.
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view, which is concerned with market power and DWL estimations, the mar-
ginal cost e¢ ciency is a more relevant e¢ ciency concept compared to the cost
e¢ ciency concept.
Let Pt = P (Qt;Xd;t) be the inverse demand function, Qt be the total quan-
tity, and Xd;t is a vector of demand related variables at time t. The perceived
marginal revenue (PMR) is given by:
PMR (it) = Pt +
@Pt
@Qt
@Qt
@qit
qit (4)
= Pt

1  sit
Et
it

where sit =
qit
Qt
is the market share of rm i at time t; Et =  @Qt@Pt PtQt is the
(absolute value of) elasticity of demand; it =
@Qt
@qit
is the conduct parameter.
Three benchmark values for it =
n
0; 1; 1sit
o
correspond to perfect competition,
Cournot competition, and joint prot maximization, respectively. The supply
relation is:12
Pt

1  sit
Et
it

= cit , (5)
lnPt + ln

1  sit
Et
it

= ln cit
where cit = c (qit;Xc;it). After including the econometric error terms, the supply
relation becomes:13
lnPit = ln c

it + git + uit + "
s
it (6)
where git = g (it; sit; Et) =   ln

1  sitEt it

 0 is the market power term,
which is an increasing function of it; uit  0 is the ine¢ ciency term; and "sit is
the two-sided error term.
The Et term is identied through the demand equation. Intuitively, Equa-
tion (4) suggests that if cit and qit are highly collinear, then the conduct pa-
rameter may be identied through the variation in @Pt@Qt . We assume that the
demand and marginal cost functions are such that the conduct parameter and
marginal cost can be separately identied.14 In most cases, identication is a
problem when the demand function is linear. For example, when the demand
and marginal cost functions are linear, we do not observe a variation in @Pt@Qt , and
cit and qit are perfectly collinear. In this case, we cannot separately identify the
12Note that perceived marginal revenue must be positive so that the equilibrium makes
sense. Hence, we assume that 1  sit
Et
it > 0. So, we have ln

1  sit
Et
it

 0.
13The introduction of the error term enables us to deviate from a single market price. Also,
the price may be considered to be a function of rm specic variables, Xd;it.
14For details about the identication conditions for conduct parameter models, we direct
the reader to Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982), Perlo¤ et al. (2007), and Perlo¤ and Shen (2012).
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conduct parameter and marginal cost. One way to achieve identication is as-
suming constant marginal cost.15 Another commonly used approach that does
not require constant marginal cost assumption is including the cross-product
of quantity and an exogenous variable in the demand equation. When such
cross-products are included in the model, the identication of conduct parame-
ter is achieved through both parallel shifts and rotations of the demand curve.
Bresnahan (1982) illustrates how identication can be achieved by such rota-
tions for the linear demand and linear marginal cost case. He states that the
logic of identication is maintained even if the curves are not linear. In gen-
eral, the conduct parameter is identiable if the inverse demand function is not
separable in exogenous variables, Z, and the number of exogenous variables is
enough. More precisely, we can write the inverse demand function P so that
P = f (Q; r (Z)) where Z is a vector of exogenous variables but P does not take
the form P = Q 1=r (Z) + h (Q) for some functions f , r, and h if and only if
the identication is impossible.
Our model is di¤erent from the standard market power models due to the
additional uit term. This ine¢ ciency term, uit, is identied by utilizing the
asymmetric distribution of the composed error term, i.e., uit + "sit. Intuitively,
uit is identied if the signal-to-noise ratio (the variance ratio of the ine¢ ciency
component to the composed error) is not small. Hence, the identication of
model parameters requires the standard conduct parameter model and stochas-
tic frontier model identication assumptions to hold when there are endogenous
variables.16
Following Kutlu and Sickles (2012), Figure 1 aims to illustrate the under-
lying mechanism of our model and consequences of ignoring ine¢ ciency when
calculating DWL. The gure includes inverse demand function, perceived mar-
ginal revenue (PMR), marginal revenue (MR) that is corresponding to monopoly
scenario, marginal cost (MC), and e¢ cient marginal cost (EMC). For illustra-
tive purposes, we consider the same constant marginal costs, conducts, and
e¢ ciencies for each rm. P and Q are the equilibrium price and quantity at
conduct level . Similarly, PC and QC are price and quantity for the perfect
competition scenario in which conduct equals 0. In the gure, it is assumed
that under perfect competition there would be no ine¢ ciency. If QLH holds,
then as the market power, measured by , increases MC diverges from EMC.
In our framework, the marginal cost e¢ ciency is dened as EMC=MC. The
social welfare loss at conduct level  would be equal to the shaded area (sum
of dark and light shaded regions). In Figure 1, the e¢ ciency is roughly 60%,
which is relatively low.17 As a result the social welfare loss due to ine¢ ciency
is substantial. The conventional DWL value, which is ignoring ine¢ ciency, is
given by the dark shaded triangular area; and is much smaller than the overall
15Note that a constant marginal cost function does not depend on quantity but it may still
depend on variables other than the quantity.
16At the end of this section, we provide a discussion about identication condition for
stochastic frontier models with endogenous regressors.
17 In the gure, for the sake of illustrating the ideas better, we rather use market level
conduct parameter.
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social welfare loss. When there is heterogeneity either in e¢ ciencies or mar-
ginal cost frontiers of rms (under constant MC assumption), the calculation of
DWL would be similar except that EMC would be a step function rather than
a horizontal line.
Figure 1: Conduct, marginal cost e¢ ciency, and social welfare
Now, we describe how this conduct parameter game would be estimated.
We assume that the conduct parameter it is a function of variables, Xg;it, that
a¤ect rm specic market power such as market shares and concentration ratios.
Modeling it through this function may lead to computational di¢ culties. In
contrast, git can be modeled directly as a function of Xg;it so that it is solved
after getting the parameter estimates. That is, we can calculate the estimate of
it as follows:
^it =
E^t
sit
(1  exp ( g^it)) (7)
where E^t and g^it are the estimates for Et and git, respectively. The market
power term, git, is bounded by 0 and Bit =   ln

1  1Et

. It follows that the
choice of functional form should be so that git 2 [0; Bit]. In this study, we use:
git =
Bit exp
 
X 0g;itg

1 + exp
 
X 0g;itg
 . (8)
One of the drawbacks of the standard stochastic frontier models is that if
the regressors are correlated with vit or uit, then the parameter and e¢ ciency
estimates are inconsistent. In this setting, vit and uit terms are assumed to be
independent, which can be a questionable assumption in a variety of settings.
Similar to Kutlu (2010), Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017a, b), and Kutlu et al.
(2018), we use a limited information maximum likelihood based approach to
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handle the endogeneity issue that occurs when the two-sided error term is cor-
related with the regressors or uit. The approach solves the endogeneity issue by
including a bias correction term in the model. For example, uit can be a func-
tion of regressors (e.g., market shares of rms or concentration ratios) that are
correlated with the two-sided error term. Consider the following supply relation
model with endogenous explanatory variables:
lnPit = ln c

it + git + uit + "
s
it (9)
Xen;it = 
0
it + wit
~wit
"sit




 1=2
w wit
"sit

 N

0
0

;

Im "
0" 2"

uit = hit~uit
hit  0
~uit  N+
 
u; 
2
u

where Pit is the price; Xen;it is an m1 vector of all endogenous variables used
in modelling cit, git, and uit; it = Im 
 Zit where Zit is a l  1 (with l  m)
vector of all exogenous variables. The irregular term "sit is correlated with the
regressors but independent of ~uit conditional on Xen;it and Zit.18 Hence, "sit is
independent of uit conditional on Xen;it and Zit. Note that "sit and uit may still
be correlated unconditionally. By applying a Cholesky decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of

~w0it "
s
it
0
, we can rewrite the supply equation
as follows:
lnPit = ln c

it + git + "
0 ~wit + uit + ~"sit (10)
= ln cit + git + 
0(Xen;it    0it ) + uit + ~"sit
where ~"sit  N(0; (1 0)2") and  = "0 1=2w . The parameters of this supply
relation can be estimated in one stage with the maximum likelihood estimation
method. However, sometimes it is simpler to get the consistent parameter esti-
mates in two stages by rst estimating the bias correction term 0
 
Xen;it    0it

and then including the estimate of bias correction term in the second stage where
we apply traditional SFA methods.19 For the two-stage approach, the standard
errors need to be corrected, e.g., by a bootstrap procedure. In our empirical
section, we use the limited information maximum likelihood estimator that we
presented in this section, i.e., the one-stage method.
Amsler et al. (2016, 2017) relax the conditional independence assumption for
"sit and ~uit by using a copula approach. Kutlu et al. (2018) show by simulations
that if the rm-specic individual e¤ects are included in the model, even if "sit
and ~uit are correlated conditionally, the estimates are still reasonable. When it
is di¢ cult to nd instruments for endogenous variables, one may use the copula
18We may replace uit = hit~uit assumption by uit = hit~ui so that ~ui is a rm specic term.
This would be in line with the panel data stochastic frontier models.
19This bias correction term is said to be a control function.
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approach proposed by Tran and Tsionas (2015). Their model does not require
the availability of outside information. Instead, to obtain the instruments, a
exible joint distribution of the endogenous variables and composed error is
constructed. If the researcher is inclined to use Bayesian methods, the sto-
chastic frontier model of Gri¢ ths and Hajargasht (2016) can be applied to our
framework. Traditional stochastic frontier models impose ine¢ cient behavior
on all rms. If it is believed there is a mixture of e¢ cient and ine¢ cient rms in
the sample, it is possible to apply the model of Tran and Tsionas (2016).20 Fi-
nally, one can disentangle rm specic heterogeneity from ine¢ ciency by using
variations of true-xed e¤ects (or true-random e¤ects) model of Greene (2005a,
2005b) that allow endogeneity as in Kutlu et al. (2018). For example, in the
airport and banking cost e¢ ciency contexts Kutlu et al. (2018) and Kutlu
and McCarthy (2017), respectively, illustrate that e¢ ciency estimates can be
substantially di¤erent if productive unit heterogeneity is not controlled in the
estimations.
In the stochastic frontier model that we presented, we have exogenous and
endogenous regressors along with some outside instruments.Hence, our iden-
tication assumptions are somewhat di¤erent from the standard stochastic fron-
tier models without endogenous variables. Our main identication assumption
is that the exogenous variables (including the outside instruments) are uncor-
related with "sit and wit and that there are enough instruments. If "
s
it and wit
are independent of the exogenous variables (including the outside instruments),
then for each endogenous variable and its functions a single control function
would be enough to achieve identication. For example, if z is a valid instru-
ment for an endogenous variable x, then the model parameters can be identied
by a single control function even when the model has x and x2 as regressors.21
In order to make our contribution clearer, we nalize this section by com-
paring our model with two closely related papers. Kutlu and Sickles (2012) con-
sider a dynamic conduct parameter model in which under the full market power
scenario the rms play an e¢ cient super-game equilibrium where the rms co-
operate subject to incentive compatibility constraints. They estimate a market
specic aggregate model and assume that the corresponding aggregate incentive
compatibility constraint is a function of e¢ ciency. The only place that e¢ ciency
enters their model is within the incentive compatibility constraint causing the
parameter estimates from the static counterpart of their model to be invariant to
the presence of ine¢ ciency. This contrasts with our setting as our static model
directly includes ine¢ ciency in the supply equation. For their static model, the
presence of e¢ ciency matters only in the calculation of DWL. Although Kutlu
and Sickles (2012) introduce the marginal cost e¢ ciency concept, they assume
that marginal cost e¢ ciency equals cost e¢ ciency (in the SFA sense), which is a
somewhat strong assumption. Hence, they simply estimate a stochastic frontier
cost function to obtain the cost e¢ ciencies of the rms. A direct implication of
20See also Guan et al. (2009) and Tran and Tsionas (2013) for GMM based approaches for
handling endogeneity in SFA framework.
21See Amsler et al. (2016) for further details of identication in SFA models with endogenous
variables.
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this is that their dynamic model requires total cost data.
In another closely related study, Delis and Tsionas (2009) estimate a supply-
demand-cost system where the cost function is modeled in the SFA framework.
Hence, this study requires total cost data and e¢ ciency concept is cost e¢ ciency
in the SFA sense. Their supply equation is derived from a standard conduct
parameter model, which is invariant to the presence of ine¢ ciency, and cost
ine¢ ciency enters their model only through the stochastic frontier cost function.
This contrasts with our setting as our model directly includes (marginal cost)
ine¢ ciency in the supply equation. As a nal remark, supply equation of Delis
and Tsionas (2009) has revenue as the dependent variable and the right-hand-
side variables include cross products of (total) cost with many other variables,
which are expected to be endogenous in this setting. This complication may
pose some estimation related di¢ culties if not controlled properly.
4 The Data
In order to testify our theoretical framework, we use the U.S. domestic air-
line data. One of the main data sources that we use is the Passenger Origin-
Destination Survey of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DB1B data set).
This data set is a 10% random sample of all tickets that originate in the U.S.
on domestic ights. In our data set a market is dened as a directional city-pair
(route). Calculation of prices and quantities are based on the tickets that have
no more than three segments in each direction. Approximately 1% of tickets
are eliminated during the elimination of tickets with more than 3 segments. We
only focus on coach class tickets due to the di¤erences in demand elasticities
and other characteristics between coach class and high-end classes (rst class
and business class).
Our data set covers the time period from the rst quarter of 1999 to fourth
quarter of 2009. During this time period, the U.S. airlines faced serious nancial
problems. As pointed out by Duygun et al. (2016), the nancial losses for
domestic passenger airline operations during this time period were substantially
higher than their losses between 1979 and 1999. Increase in taxes and jet fuel
prices, relatively low fares, and sharp decrease in demand were some of the
challenges facing U.S. airlines. During this time period, there were dramatic
increases in load factors. Borenstein (2011) argues that such an increase might
be attributed to improved yield management techniques.
We provide the details about data construction process as follows. First, all
multi-destination tickets are dropped as it is di¢ cult to identify the tickets ori-
gin and destination without knowing the exact purpose of the trip. Second, any
itinerary that involves international ights was eliminated. Third, the fare class
for high-end carrier was adjusted. That is, for some airlines, due to marketing
strategies, only rst class and business class (high-end) tickets are provided to
consumers on all routes. However, the quality should be taken as coach class.
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For such airlines, if there is no coach class tickets from a certain carrier in a
given quarter, we consider all tickets as coach class tickets. Fourth, tickets that
have high-end segments and unknown fare classes were dropped.
Following Borenstein (1989) and Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992), we
assume that ticketing carrier is the relevant airline. After further elimination
of multi-ticketing-carrier tickets, rm specic average segment numbers (SEG)
and average stage length (SL) on a given route are calculated as indicators for
quality and costs. Moreover, our data set includes a distance variable which
is the shortest directional ight distance (DIST ). A ticket is online when the
one-way ticket does not involve change of airplanes. The online variable is the
percentage of online tickets.
For the price variable, we use the average price of all tickets for a given
airline on a given route in given quarter.22 All tickets with incredible23 prices
are dropped from our data set. Following Borenstein (1989) and Ito and Lee
(2007), we eliminate the open-jaw tickets since it would be di¢ cult to distribute
the ticket price into outbound and inbound segment for open jaw tickets. We
drop the tickets that have a price less than 25 dollars or higher than 99 percentile
or more than 2:5 times standard deviation from the mean for each airline within
a route. The tickets that have price less than 25 dollars are considered as
frequent yer program tickets and the tickets that have prices higher than 99
percentile are considered to be input (key punch) errors for the data set. For the
round trip tickets, we divided the total price by two to get the one-way price.
The cost data set is constructed from the rm level data of DOTs airline
production data set (based on Form 41 and T100).24 While the airline-specic
total cost data are available for the whole U.S. airline industry, the route-airline-
specic total cost data are not available. We control for three types of important
costs: labor price (LP ), energy price (EP ), and capital price (KP ). The salaries
and benets for ve main types of personnel are provided in Form 41/P6. An-
nual employee number is given in Form 41, P10. We interpolated the annual
employee data to get the quarterly values. For energy price, we only capture
the cost based on aircraft fuel. The energy input is developed by combining
information on aircraft fuel gallons used with expense data per period. Flight
capital is described by the average size (measured in number of seats) of the
eet. The number of aircraft that a carrier operated from each di¤erent model
of aircraft in airlines eet is collected from DOT Form 41. For each quarter, the
average number of aircraft in service is calculated by dividing the total number
of aircraft days for all aircraft types by the number of days in the quarter. This
serves as an approximate measure of the size of eet.
In order to estimate the demand, we also include the city specic demo-
graphic variables: per capita income (PCI) and population (POP ). We ob-
tained the city level per capita income and population data from Bureau of
Labor Statistics. We interpolate the annual data to get the quarterly PCI and
22The average is calculated after eliminating the outliers.
23The incredible tickets are dened by DB1B data set.
24For more information about DOTs dataset see Weiher et al. (2002) and Good et al.
(2008).
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population variables for each city. For each origin-destination city-pair, we use
the population weighted PCI as the route-specic PCI measure. Similarly,
city-pair population is the average population of origination and destination
cities. In order to get the real prices, we deated the nominal prices by Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) and use the rst quarter of 1999 as the base time
period. Because metropolitan areas have available demographic information
whereas airports located in small cities do not, the number of the city-pairs is
further reduced in our nal data set.
We apply our theoretical method on the routes that originate from Chicago,
which is a popular choice because of its relatively large airport and wide selection
of airline rms. For instance, Brander and Zhang (1990) use 33 Chicago-based
routes in their studies. In our nal data set, we further eliminate the small
rms and small routes. On a given route, small rms with market shares less
than 0:01 are eliminated. For a given quarter, any route with enplanements less
than 1800, i.e., 20 passengers per day or routes with less than 30 observations
are dropped from the analysis. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for
Chicago-based routes.
Table 1. Summary for Chicago Originating Routes
Variables: Name in Estimation Mean S.D. Min Max
Low Cost Carrier Dummy: LCC 0.11225 0.31569 0 1
ln(Population): ln(POP) 15.50922 0.18392 15.33637 16.46417
ln(Per Capita Income): ln(PCI) 10.4226 0.03828 10.33827 10.61397
ln(Stage Length): ln(SL) 6.40837 0.59661 4.69135 8.34378
ln(Distance): ln(DIST) 6.63774 0.65719 4.69135 8.35303
ln(Average Fleet Size): ln(SIZE) 4.97262 0.08467 4.80562 5.33165
ln(Labor Price): ln(LP) 9.23198 0.7346 5.58453 10.00725
ln(Capital Price): ln(KP) 7.27984 0.76111 3.6658 8.1754
ln(Fuel Price): ln(FP) 3.87272 0.58681 2.37945 4.83215
Number of Firms: NF 8.2814 3.14474 1 24
ln(Price Per Ticket): ln(P) 4.96474 0.33975 3.72431 7.1672
ln(Number of Passengers): ln(Q) 9.79688 1.43261 7.49554 13.1454
ln(Number of Passengers for Other Routes): ln(OQOTH) 15.29761 0.10457 14.98133 15.47699
Market Share: s 0.22057 0.22458 0.01001 1
Geometric Market Share: GEOS 0.19418 0.12814 0.00682 1
Geometric Market Share*Number of Firms: GEONF 1.08933 0.66467 0.03784 4.27413
Online Rate: ONLINE 0.66744 0.36844 0 1
Top 4 Concentration Ratio: CR4 0.9195 0.11333 0.07516 1
ln(Average Number of Segments): ln(SEG) 0.3698 0.32171 0 1.09861
Number of Observations 18209
Low cost carrier (LCC) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ticketing
carrier is a low cost carrier, otherwise it is 0. Number of rms represents the total
number of rms that operate on the route. The total number of passengers is the
total number of tickets sold on a given route by all airlines together in a given
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quarter. Total number of passengers for other routes (OQOTH) variable is the
total number of tickets that are sold on the all other routes that share the same
origination city. We use the geometric market share (GEOS) variable of Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009) as an instrument.25 Another instrumental variable that we
use is GEONF . This variable is the product of GEOS and nf =
p
no  nd,
where no denotes to the mean value of number of rms for all routes that share
the same origination as route of interest while the nd refers to the mean value
of number of rms for all routes that share the same destination city.
The nal data set contains 108 routes that originate from Chicago and 14
carriers. The low cost carriers are Frontier Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Southwest
Airlines, and Spirit Airlines. The remaining carriers are: Alaska Airlines, Amer-
ican Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United
Airlines, US Airways, America West Airlines, ATA Airlines, and Trans World
Airways.
5 Empirical Example
The purpose of this section is providing an empirical example for our theoretical
model. In particular, we estimate time-varying rm-route-specic conducts and
marginal cost e¢ ciencies of U.S. airlines for Chicago based routes. Like Brander
and Zhang (1990) and Oum et al. (1993), we only consider coach class tickets.
Brander and Zhang (1990) conclude that there is Cournot type competition
in the airline industry, i.e., competition is quantity based. Hence, we assume
a quantity based competition.26 Our city-pair markets consist of one-way or
round-trip directional trips having up to three segments in each direction. We
divide the total ticket price by 2 to get the one-way fare for round-trip tick-
ets. The demand and supply equations are estimated separately. The market
demand equation is given by:
lnPitr = 0 + 1 lnQtr + 2 lnPCItr lnQtr + fd (Xd;itr) + "
d
itr (11)
where fd is a function of demand related variables, Qtr is the total quantity at
time t for route r, Xd;itr is a vector of demand related variables, and "ditr is the
conventional two-sided error term. We assume that lnQtr and lnPCItr lnQtr
are endogenous. Along with the exogenous variables included in the demand
model, our instrumental variables areGEOSitr, GEONFitr, lnOQOTHrt, loga-
rithm of labor price (lnLPit), logarithm of capital price (lnKPit), and logarithm
of energy price (lnEPit).
25GEOS is the GENSP variable that is used in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). GENSP is
similar to the GEOSHARE variable of Borenstein and Rose (1994). The di¤erence is that
Borenstein and Rose (1994) use average daily enplanements while we use average quarterly
enplanements.
26Kutlu and Sickles (2012) also assume quantity competition for airlines.
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The supply equation is given by:
lnPitr = ln c

itr + gitr + uitr + "
s
itr (12)
where citr is the marginal cost when rms achieve full e¢ ciency, gitr =   ln

1  sitrEtr itr

is the market power term, uitr  0 is the ine¢ ciency term, and "sitr is the con-
ventional two sided error term. The parameters of the Etr term is identied
through the demand equation. We assume that the e¢ cient marginal cost, citr,
is constant with respect to quantity, i.e., it is not a function of quantity but
maybe a function of exogenous cost shifters. Hence, as we described in the
theoretical model section, the theoretical values for cost and marginal cost e¢ -
ciencies coincide in this model. Although constant marginal cost is a relatively
strong assumption, it is commonly used in the conduct parameter models. Iwata
(1974), Genesove and Mullin (1998), Corts (1999), and Puller (2007) exemplify
some papers that use this assumption in a variety of conduct parameter set-
tings. We use this simplifying assumption to illustrate our methodology. Nev-
ertheless, we approximate the e¢ cient marginal cost function by a fairly exible
function of input prices and other cost related exogenous variables. These cost
related variables include year, quarter, and airline dummy variables, which cap-
ture time-rm-specic unobserved factors.27 Moreover, constant marginal cost
assumption is not unreasonable at least around the equilibrium as there is sub-
stantial empirical evidence supporting constant returns to scale for the airline
industry. We model gitr as in the theoretical model section and assume that
Xg;itr = (sitr; CR4;tr; lnDISTr; t; Etr; 1)
0 where CR4;tr is the concentration ra-
tio for largest four rms on route r at time t. We assume that uitr = hitr~uitr
and ~uitr  N+
 
0; 2u

where 2u = exp
 
X 0g;itru

; and "sitr  N
 
0; 2"

where
2" = exp ("). For the supply side, sitr and CR4;tr are assumed to be en-
dogenous. Our instrumental variables are GEOSitr, GEONFitr, lnPOPtr, and
lnPCItr. The estimations of the supply relations are done by using the limited
information maximum likelihood estimation method that we described in our
theoretical model section.
6 Results
In this section, we present our estimation results. The demand parameter esti-
mates for the routes originating from Chicago are given in Table 2. We estimated
the inverse demand equation by 2SLS. Our demand model controls for year,
27 If the airlines are playing a version of dynamic conduct parameters game that is suggested
by Puller (2009), route-specic time dummy variables would capture dynamic factors that
enter the airlines optimization problems as well. In this case, the estimates of parameters,
conduct parameters, and e¢ ciencies would still be consistent. However, the marginal cost
estimates may be downward biased as the prediction of marginal costs include these dynamic
factors. Nevertheless, the e¢ cient full marginal cost estimates would be consistent.
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quarter, and airline. The demand elasticities are negative at each observation,
i.e., Etr > 0.28
Table 2. Estimation for Demand Function
Dependent Variable: Price Estimates Std. Err.
ln(Q) 2.91356*** (0.50629)
ln(Q)*ln(PCI) -0.29270*** (0.04861)
ONLINE 0.01940* (0.00880)
ln(DIST) 7.47912*** (0.95064)
ln(SEG) -10.03281*** (0.97631)
ln(SIZE) -15.81152*** (2.31769)
ln(SL) -8.24091*** (0.97745)
ln(DIST) Square -0.22445** (0.07828)
ln(SEG) Square 0.53698*** (0.11695)
ln(SIZE) Square 1.50167*** (0.22554)
ln(SL) Square -0.62278*** (0.08377)
ln(DIST)* SEG -0.65458** (0.19646)
ln(DIST)* ln(SIZE) -1.93435*** (0.18417)
ln(DIST)* ln(SL) 0.90929*** (0.15754)
ln(SEG)* ln(SIZE) 2.44755*** (0.19223)
ln(SEG)* ln(SL) 0.24996 (0.19551)
ln(SIZE)* ln(SL) 1.98114*** (0.18886)
ln(POP) 0.30783*** (0.01673)
ln(PCI) 4.19634*** (0.56805)
LCC -0.21325*** (0.00862)
Quarter Dummies Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Firm Dummies Yes
Centered R Square 0.4976
Number of Observations 18209
Note: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Robust standard errors are given in bracket.
For the supply function, as we described previously, we use the one-stage
limited information maximum likelihood approach to deal with endogeneity. In
28Recall that we dene Et =   @Qt@Pt
Pt
Qt
.
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order to illustrate the consequences of ignoring marginal cost ine¢ ciency, we es-
timated two supply models: the rst one allows ine¢ ciency (benchmark model)
and the second one assumes full e¢ ciency so that uitr = 0 (full-e¢ ciency model).
The full-e¢ ciency model is a standard conduct parameter model, which helps
us to compare our benchmark estimates with the standard conduct parameter
models. Both models include airline, year, and quarter dummy variables.29
Table 3 shows the estimation results. The bias correction terms () are
jointly signicant at any conventional signicance level, which is an indication
of endogeneity. The median of the conduct estimates from the benchmark model
is 0:63, which is lower than the theoretical conduct value for Cournot compe-
tition, 1.30 At the median, the extent of competition lies somewhere between
perfect competition and Cournot competition. The median of conduct estimates
from the full-e¢ ciency model is somewhat lower, 0:22, suggesting a competitive
market. In other words, when we allow ine¢ ciency, the median conduct is closer
to Cournot competition benchmark, i.e.,  = 1; and when we assume full ef-
ciency, the median conduct is closer to perfect competition benchmark, i.e.,
 = 0. Moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smirmov test rejects the equality of the distri-
butions at any conventional signicance levels. This illustrates the importance
of considering marginal cost ine¢ ciency when estimating a conduct parameter
model.
LCCs, due to their special operating style31 , tend to have lower marginal
costs compared to other airlines, which helps them to o¤er lower fares. Hence, it
is worthwhile to examine the decomposition of conducts based on LCCs and non-
LCCs. Our conduct estimates from the benchmark model for LCC and non-LCC
carriers are 0:24 and 0:74, respectively. Therefore, while the conducts of LCCs
are closer to perfectly competitive values, the conducts of non-LCCs are closer
to Cournot competition values. The corresponding estimates from the full-
e¢ ciency model are 0:11 and 0:25, indicating relatively competitive markets for
both LCCs and non-LCCs. Hence, ignoring ine¢ ciency leads to underestimation
of conducts for both LCCs and non-LCCs. The underestimation of welfare loss
is boosted by the fact that the full-e¢ ciency model ignores the marginal cost
ine¢ ciency.
29Hence, as we illustrate in the Appendix, our parameter and e¢ ciency estimates are con-
sistent even when the marginal costs are stochastic.
30The median of theoretical conduct values for joint prot maximization scenario is 6:77,
which is the median of 1
sitr
.
31For example, some of them operate only on certain routes in order to reduce costs.
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Table 3. Estimation for Supply Function
Supply Function: Inefficiency Allowed Full Efficiency
Price Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
ln(KP) -0.72825*** (0.13523) -0.63778*** (0.15070)
ln(FP) 0.02501 (0.11625) 0.07255 (0.12892)
ln(LP) -0.34062* (0.14423) -0.23348 (0.16666)
ln(KP) Square 0.02449 (0.02310) 0.01674 (0.02643)
ln(FP) Square 0.01010 (0.01061) 0.01876 (0.01164)
ln(LP) Square 0.02082 (0.01929) 0.01612 (0.02175)
ln(KP)* ln(FP) 0.02793+ (0.01550) 0.02603 (0.01717)
ln(KP)* ln(LP) 0.02922 (0.04268) 0.03147 (0.04818)
ln(FP)* ln(LP) -0.04628** (0.01768) -0.05404** (0.01982)
ONLINE -0.11235*** (0.00769) -0.13278*** (0.00853)
ln(DIST) 3.25569*** (0.96877) 1.68620 (1.05468)
ln(SEG) -3.81246*** (0.95276) -1.65408 (1.01118)
ln(SIZE) -15.47651*** (3.14511) -6.51047+ (3.37444)
ln(SL) -3.46404*** (1.01353) -1.90943+ (1.10320)
ln(DIST) Square 0.41059*** (0.07352) 0.35812*** (0.07470)
ln(SEG) Square 0.88206*** (0.11481) 0.81164*** (0.11475)
ln(SIZE) Square 1.63611*** (0.31323) 0.75112* (0.33609)
ln(SL) Square 0.19687* (0.08723) 0.11232 (0.09075)
ln(DIST)* ln(SEG) -2.11495*** (0.18315) -1.75739*** (0.17727)
ln(DIST)* ln(SIZE) -0.76913*** (0.19136) -0.55407** (0.21109)
ln(DIST)* ln(SL) -0.51857** (0.15756) -0.37967* (0.16206)
ln(SEG)* ln(SL) 1.93489*** (0.18700) 1.50137*** (0.18227)
ln(SEG)* ln(SIZE) 0.94664*** (0.18911) 0.60553** (0.20198)
ln(SIZE)* ln(SL) 0.64006** (0.20052) 0.40393+ (0.22051)
LCC -0.76658*** (0.07363) -0.76248*** (0.08575)
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes
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Table 3. Estimation for Supply Function (continued)
Nonlinear Function: g Inefficiency Allowed Full Efficiency
Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
s 17.62885*** (1.77711) 17.86643*** (1.87244)
CR4 8.82176*** (2.35791) 16.89555*** (3.57813)
ln(DIST) 0.38011 (0.33349) 0.47333+ (0.27124)
t -0.22842*** (0.02998) -0.23597*** (0.03529)
Elasticity of Demand -0.13075 (0.28139) -0.89407** (0.29823)
Constant -10.53598* (5.06577) -13.87330** (4.77015)
σw
Constant -3.46254*** (0.03206) -2.70253*** (0.01051)
σu
s 0.41774*** (0.08396)
CR4 3.95924*** (0.28411)
ln(DIST) -0.94727*** (0.04206)
t -0.03700*** (0.00233)
Elasticity of Demand -0.15413*** (0.04344)
Constant 1.94036*** (0.53855)
η (bias correction term)
s -0.33883*** (0.02233) -0.33863*** (0.01947)
CR4 0.09003** (0.02838) 0.58208*** (0.02438)
Log-likelihood 30772.7323 30033.13415
Number of Observations 18209 18209
Note: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
The conduct parameter estimates show that an airline with higher market
share tends to have higher market power. In markets with high CR4 values, it
may be easier for airlines with higher market share to cooperate. The positive
coe¢ cient of CR4 in conduct veries this. For the time period that we examine,
the U.S. airlines seem to be losing market power over time. For longer ight
distances the alternative transportation means (e.g., bus or car) are likely to
become less attractive to the consumers. This reduction in outside competition
suggests a positive relationship between market power and distance. The pos-
itive coe¢ cient of distance variable for the market power term is in line with
this intuition.
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In Figure 2 and 3, the e¢ ciency and conduct estimates from our benchmark
model are presented. In our benchmark estimates, the median e¢ ciency esti-
mates for the whole sample and non-LCC carriers are 82:6% and 84:4%, respec-
tively. Hence, the e¢ ciencies of LCCs and non-LCCs are similar. The parameter
estimates for the ine¢ ciency term show that an airline with higher market share
tends to have higher ine¢ ciency. Moreover, higher CR4 values lead to lower ef-
ciency and the correlation between conduct parameter and e¢ ciency is  0:19,
which is statistically signicant at any conventional signicance level. These
are in line with the QLH which postulates that higher market power leads to
lower e¢ ciency levels.32 Based on our benchmark model, the medians of price-
marginal cost markups, price-e¢ cient marginal cost markups, and prices are
$4:65, $30:32, and $140:46, respectively. However, for the full-e¢ ciency model,
the median of price-marginal cost markups is $2:49. Historically, airlines have
been challenged in their e¤orts to generate high prots. These markup values
from our benchmark model indicate that airlines may partially be responsible
for the nancial di¢ culties that they face. Our study shows that the answer to
achieving reasonable prot levels may be through improving e¢ ciency.
Figure 2. E¢ ciency Estimates
Figure 3. Conduct Estimates
32Note that since u has a half normal distribution its mean depends on 2u. In particular,
the mean of u is an increasing function of 2u.
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Finally, we calculate a lower bound for bias in DWL estimates when the
researchers use the full-e¢ ciency model instead of the benchmark model. This
number is obtained by estimating the shaded rectangular area between MC,
EMC, and Q (see Figure 1) where we assume that Q equals total observed
quantity on a given route in a given quarter. The median of the lower bound
over all routes and quarters is $427; 715. This area measures the DWL that is
caused by e¢ ciency loss only. Hence, the DWL due to misallocation of quantity
that stems from e¢ ciency loss is not included.33 Nevertheless, this lower bound
clearly illustrates the severe consequences of ignoring marginal cost ine¢ ciency
when evaluating welfare loss using the conventional conduct parameter models.
7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provided a conduct parameter based framework to estimate
market powers and (marginal cost) e¢ ciencies of rms simultaneously. Our
methodology enables us to relax the total cost data requirement for stochastic
frontier models. Total cost data may not be available for a variety of reasons. For
example, rms might not want to reveal this potentially strategic information.
Even when some form of total cost data are available, the data may not reect
the total cost of the relevant unit that we want to examine. For instance, in
our empirical example, for the U.S. airlines only rm specic total cost data
is available for the entire U.S. airline system. In such cases, the conventional
stochastic frontier models cannot estimate rm-route specic e¢ ciencies as this
would require rm-route specic total cost data.
Besides relaxing a vital data requirement, our methodology aims to overcome
some estimation issues. E¢ ciencies are generally measured by the distance
between the units of production and the best practice units observed in the
market. If the performance of the best-practice units depends on their market
powers, then the e¢ ciency estimates that are not taking this into account would
not be accurate. We overcome this di¢ culty by explicitly modeling a conduct
parameter game in an environment where rms are allowed to be ine¢ cient.
In the Appendix, we provide extensions of our model for a variety of di¤erent
settings including capacity constraints, stochastic marginal costs, multi-output
rms, and dynamic strategic interactions. Another potential extension of our
conduct parameter model is so that the rms price discriminate. For example,
the marginal cost e¢ ciency concept can be incorporated into the conduct pa-
rameter games of Kutlu (2012a, 2017a) and Kutlu and Sickles (2017). Such an
extension would enable us to understand the connection between price discrim-
ination, market power, and e¢ ciency better.34 Hence, our theoretical model
33Note that the triangular welfare loss area (shaded area between Q and QC in Figure 1)
for the benchmark model is larger compared to that of full-e¢ ciency model. Therefore, the
rectengular area that we estimated is a lower bound for the DWL bias.
34Borenstein and Rose (1994), Stavins (2001), Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), and Chakrabarty
and Kutlu (2014) examine the relationship between market power and price discrimination.
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serves as a guideline as to how conduct parameter and e¢ ciency can be esti-
mated simultaneously without requiring total cost data. Our guideline can be
applied to a variety of conduct parameter settings.
As for the standard DWL calculations, our e¢ ciency measure for marginal
cost does not consider the xed costs for the short run. It is possible to consider
dynamic frameworks where prior investments and R&D may a¤ect xed costs
and marginal costs. Hence, suboptimal investment decisions may result in sub-
optimal marginal cost levels even when the marginal cost may seem optimal in a
single time horizon for given investment and R&D levels. This type of e¢ ciency
is not controlled in our conduct parameter model or in a standard stochastic
frontier model. Moreover, similar to the standard stochastic frontier models, we
assume that the input market is perfectly competitive. Hence, our model ignores
potential market power in the input markets. The advantage of our framework
over SFA setting is that we can make such structural extensions relatively easier
compared to SFA setting using the already-established industrial organization
literature.
We applied our methodology to estimate the conducts and marginal cost
e¢ ciencies of the U.S. airlines for the Chicago based routes between 1999I-
2009IV. We found that the market concentration and market share of airlines
are negatively related to the marginal cost e¢ ciency, which is in line with the
QLH. We also found that the conduct and DWL estimations may be seriously
distorted if ine¢ ciency is ignored. A more extensive empirical study is warranted
but we consider this outside the scope of this paper. For example, a future
study may consider a more complete list of U.S. routes and a longer time period.
Moreover, although we control for the airline specic factors by including airline
and time dummy variables, a study including variables related to on time rate,
food service, aircraft engine information, and aircraft seat specication may be
worth exploring.
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9 Appendix: Extensions of Theoretical Model
The theoretical model we presented illustrates how the marginal cost e¢ ciency
concept can be incorporated to a simple yet commonly used conduct parameter
model. It is possible to apply similar ideas to a variety of di¤erent conduct para-
meter models. In this appendix, we briey present some alternative frameworks
where marginal cost e¢ ciency concept can be used.
9.1 Capacity Constraints
Our model can be extended to a setting in which rms have capacity constraints.
This extension of our model is inspired by the conduct parameter model pro-
posed by Puller (2007). In the presence of capacity constraints the optimization
problem for rm i becomes:
max
qit
Ptqit   Cit s.t. qit  Kit (13)
where Kit is the capacity constraint that rm i is facing at time t. The rst
order conditions for the corresponding conduct parameter game are:
Pt =  itP 0tqit + cit + it (14)
where it  0 is the shadow cost of capacity which can be estimated by including
variables capturing extent of capacity constraints. For example, Puller (2007)
uses a dummy variable, which is equals one when a constraint is binding. If we
let ~cit = c

it + it and ~cit = cit + it, as earlier we have:
lnPit = ln ~c

it + git + uit + "
s
it. (15)
The presence of it may make it di¢ cult to estimate this model. A solu-
tion may be to use an ine¢ ciency variable, rit  0, which enters the equation
additively:
Pit =  itP 0tqit + cit + it + rit + "sit (16)
where cit = cit + rit, rit  N+
 
r; 
2
r

, and "sit is the usual two-sided error
term.
In line with the standard stochastic frontier models, in our original model the
realized marginal cost (cit) is assumed to be a multiple of minimum (frontier)
marginal cost (cit); and the ratio of e¢ cient marginal cost to realized marginal
cost (cit=cit) is dened as marginal cost e¢ ciency. In this setting, the realized
marginal cost is assumed to follow ln cit = ln cit+uit where uit  0.35 E¢ ciency
is calculated using the estimates from this log-transformed multiplicative form
by Effit = cit=cit = exp ( uit). In this example, the ine¢ ciency term, rit,
35For expositional purposes, we ignore the two-sided error term.
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enters the model additively. Hence, rit measures the marginal cost e¢ ciency
additively. That is, we model the realized marginal cost by cit = cit + rit
where rit  0. Similar to its multiplicative counterpart, this model additively
measures how large the realized marginal cost is relative to the e¢ cient marginal
cost. After estimating the parameters of the additive model, e¢ ciency can be
estimated by Effit = cit=cit = c

it= (c

it + rit). Depending on the structural
model used, the researcher may nd either multiplicative, uit, or additive, rit,
versions of e¢ ciency variable convenient. However, it seems that for the game
theoretic models, the additive version may be more frequently needed.
9.2 Stochastic Marginal Cost
Until now we considered models where the rms have perfect information about
the marginal costs. However, rms may not always have perfect information
about their marginal costs. In such cases, they would maximize their expected
prots. We provide a simple example for how this issue can be handled in our
framework. Assume that the marginal costs of the rms are stochastic in the
sense that:
ln cit = ln c

it + uit + vit (17)
where the ine¢ ciency level, uit, and the distribution of vit  N(0; 2v) is known
by the rms but vit is not observed by neither the rms nor the researcher. In
this scenario, the perceived marginal revenue would be equal to the expected
marginal cost. As earlier, the perceived marginal revenue is given by:
PMR (it) = Pt

1  sit
Et
it

. (18)
The expectation of marginal cost is given by:
E [cit] = c

it exp (uit)E [exp (vit)] (19)
= cit exp (uit) exp

1
2
2v

)
ln (E [cit]) =  + ln c

it + uit
where  = 12
2
v. Hence, after adding the error term, the supply equation for
rm i is given by:
lnPit =  + ln c

it + git + uit + "
s
it. (20)
This supply equation is the same as the deterministic cost function scenario
except for the addition of the constant term, . If vit is heteroskedastic so that
vit  N(0; 2vi) where 2vi is rm specic, the model becomes:
lnPit = i + ln c

it + git + uit + "
s
it. (21)
This model can be estimated using the true individual e¤ects model of Kutlu
et al. (2017).
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9.3 Multi-Output Firms
Single-output scenario may be restrictive in some contexts such as banking (e.g.,
Berger and Hannan, 1998; Koetter at al., 2012; and Kutlu, 2012b). Therefore,
we provide a conduct parameter model with multi-output rms. Without loss of
generality, we assume that there are two outputs and the corresponding demands
are represented by P1 (Q) and P2 (Q) where Q = (Q1; Q2) is the market output
vector. The cost function for rm i is Ci (qi) where qi = (q1i; q2i) represents the
rm output vector. The prot function for rm i is given by:
it = P1 (Qt) q1it + P2 (Qt) q2it   Cit (qi) . (22)
Hence, perceived marginal revenues for outputs are:
PMR1 (it) = P1t +
@P1t
@Q1t
@Q1t
@q1it
q1it +
@P2t
@Q1t
@Q1t
@q1it
q2it (23)
= P1t +

@P1t
@Q1t
q1it +
@P2t
@Q1t
q2it

1it
PMR2 (it) = P2t +

@P1t
@Q2t
q1it +
@P2t
@Q2t
q2it

2it
where it = (1it; 2it) =

@Q1t
@q1it
; @Q2t@q2it

is the vector of conducts for each output.
In line with Nash equilibrium solution, we assume that @Q2t@q1it = 0 and
@Q1t
@q2it
= 0.
After adding the error terms, the supply relations become:
P1t =  

@P1t
@Q1t
q1it +
@P2t
@Q1t
q2it

1it + c

1it + r1it + "
s
1it (24)
P2t =  

@P1t
@Q2t
q1it +
@P2t
@Q2t
q2it

2it + c

2it + r2it + "
s
2it
where r1it  N+
 
r1 ; 
2
r1

and r2it  N+
 
r2 ; 
2
r2

represent the corresponding
marginal cost ine¢ ciencies additively so that c1it = c1it + r1it and c2it = c

2it +
r2it; and "s1it and "
s
2it are the usual two-sided error terms. After estimating the
demand equations, these supply equations can be estimated separately using
stochastic frontier methods that we described above.
9.4 Dynamic Strategic Interactions
A formal treatment of conduct parameter games in which the strategic in-
teractions of the rms are dynamic is beyond the scope of this study. How-
ever, following Puller (2009), we recommend including time xed-e¤ects, which
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may condition out the dynamic e¤ects in rmsoptimization problems.36 Even
though the estimates of parameters (including parameters of the conduct and
e¢ ciency) are consistent in this dynamic game scenario, we cannot separately
identify the e¢ cient marginal costs, cit, and dynamic correction terms because
the time dummies capture not only cost related unobserved factors that change
over time but also the dynamic correction terms.37 Nevertheless, except for the
portion of time xed-e¤ects that contribute to cit, the other parameters of c

it are
identied. Moreover, many times cit is not the main interest. In our empirical
example, we assume a static model, which is not subject to these identication
issues.
Finally, it is possible to extend the dynamic model of Kutlu and Sickles
(2012) using similar procedures that we presented. However, since their game
theoretical model estimates market-time specic conducts, the extension of this
model would estimate market-time specic conduct and marginal cost e¢ ciency.
36See Puller (2009) for further details about his model and restrictions. One particular
assumption that Puller (2009) makes is that the rms play an e¢ cient super-game equilibrium
when they cooperate. That is, they maximize the joint prot subject to incentive compatibility
constraints. Hence, the corresponding e¢ cient super-game equilibrium values are benchmark
for the full market power case.
37 In the static setting we dont have this identication issue as the dynamic correction terms
are zero.
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